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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-GRANDPARENT VISITATION RIGHTS:
NORTH DAKOTA DECLARES THE GRANDPARENT
VISITATION STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Hoff v. Berg 1999 N.D. 115, 595 N.W.2d 285
I. FACTS
In 1992, Holly Berg and Nathan Hoff had a child, D.R.H., out of
wedlock.' Nathan was in prison at the time of the birth, but Holly and
Nathan began residing together when he was released. 2 Eventually,
Holly asked Nathan to move out of their home because of his drinking
and drug use. 3 Although he was adjudicated the father of D.R.H.,
Nathan had never been formally granted visitation rights. 4
During the first several years of D.R.H.'s life, Jerome and Nicolette
Hoff, Nathan's parents, spent a significant amount of time with their
grandson. 5 They went out of their way to find time to see D.R.H.,6 and
they purchased numerous items to make their grandson feel at home any
time he came to visit.7 It was during this time that Jerome and Nicolette
Hoff grew very close to D.R.H., developing what they described as a
lasting bond.8
In 1995, Holly married Dan Berg, and D.R.H. was diagnosed as
having Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder (ADHD) shortly after, in
1996.9 This condition requires a very strict schedule and consistent rules
for D.R.H.10 Holly claimed that although she made attempts to get
Jerome and Nicolette Hoff to work with her on D.R.H.'s ADHD care
plan, the Hoffs ignored Holly's desires to keep D.R.H. away from what
she perceived as the "negative influences" that surrounded the Hoffs'
household.11
1. See Hoff v. Berg, 1999 N.D. 115, 12, 595 N.W.2d 285, 286.
2. Brief of Appellee at 1, Hoff v. Berg, 1999 N.D. 115, 595 N.W.2d 285 (No. 980208).
3. Id.
4. See Brief of Appellant at 3, Hoff v. Berg, 1999 N.D. 115, 595 N.W.2d 285 (No. 980208).
Nathan also has been ordered to pay child support. Id.
5. See id. (stating that during the first several years of D.R.H.'s life, the Hoffs saw their grand-
child on a daily basis).
6. Id. If Holly and Nathan needed a baby sitter, the Hoffs would cancel their plans in order to
see D.R.H. and the Hoffs would volunteer to take D.R.H any time Holly needed a break. Id.
7. See id. Jerome and Nicolette Hoff purchased a crib, a high chair, a swing, and a playpen. Id.
When D.R.H. became a toddler, they purchased a bed for him, and they always made sure they were
stocked with diapers, food, baby shampoo, socks, shoes, jackets, and anything they thought D.R.H.
might need. Id.
8. Id.
9. Brief of Appellee at 2, Hoff v. Berg, 1999 N.D. 115, 595 N.W.2d 285 (No. 980208).
10. Id.
11. See id. The negative influences to which Holly was referring included Nathan's friends, the
Hoff's pit bull that had snapped at D.R.H., allowing D.R.H. to watch adult television, and toys the
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One of the major negative influences in D.R.H.'s life that con-
cerned Holly was Nathan.12 He had a history of run-ins with the law that
included beating a person almost to death and assaulting a police
officer. 13 He also was known to associate with murderers and felons and
had been a drug user and dealer.14 In addition, Nathan spent time in
prison, including time spent for terrorizing Holly, and had threatened to
kill Holly if she would not let him see D.R.H. I5 For these reasons, Holly
felt compelled to limit Jerome and Nicolette's visits with D.R.H.16
Although the Hoffs were unhappy with the visitation schedule Holly
afforded them, they reluctantly agreed to it in order to see D.R.H.17
However, Holly did not permit the Hoffs to buy their grandson gifts, call
or write him, or attend his public performances in gymnastics. 18 This
limited visitation prompted the Hoffs to sue Holly under North Dakota
Century Code section 14-09-05.1, the grandparent visitation statute, for
"implementation of a visitation schedule allowing the enforcement of
their visitation rights."19
The trial court found North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-
05.1 unconstitutional and dismissed the Hoffs' claim. 20 The Hoffs
appealed, and the North Dakota Supreme Court held that North Dakota
Century Code section 14-09-05.1 was unconstitutional because it vio-
lated parents' fundamental liberty interest by interfering with parents'
right to choose those with whom their children may associate. 21
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Prior to the adoption of grandparent visitation statutes, the issue of
grandparent visitation was decided according to common law.22 Begin-
ning in 1965, however, legislatures sympathetic to the plight of grand-
Hoffs gave D.R.H. that were inappropriate for his age. Id. at 4.
12. Id. at 3.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. Nathan was in jail for assaulting a police officer at the time of the trial and was also
awaiting trial on rape and terrorizing charges. Id.
16. Id. at 5.
17. Brief of Appellant at 4, Hoff v. Berg, 1999 N.D. 115, 595 N.W.2d 285 (No. 980208).
18. Id. Holly cited Nathan Hoff's extensive legal problems as the reason for the Hoffs' re-
stricted visitation. Id.
19. Hoff v. Berg, 1999 N.D. 115, 1 2, 595 N.W.2d 285, 286-87. Section 14-09-05.1 of the North
Dakota Century Code, as amended in 1993, presumes that it is in the best interests of an unmarried
minor for the minor's grandparents to be granted visitation rights. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1
(1993).
20. N.D. Cent. Code § 14-09--5.1.; see also Hoff, 3, 595 N.W.2d at 287.
21. See id. 18, 595 N.W.2d at 291-92 (holding the parents' right to choose with whom their chil-
dren may associate is a right protected by the Due Process Clause of United States and North Dakota
Constitutions).
22. See Jouett v. Rhorer, 339 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960) (stating that under common
law, grandparents had no legal visitation rights).
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parents began to enact grandparent visitation statutes. 23 Several of these
statutes have been constitutionally challenged as violating parents' funda-
mental right to raise their children.24 This section focuses on the evolu-
tion of grandparent visitation rights, beginning with common law and
then turning to the enactment of grandparent visitation statutes and
discussing the constitutional questions surrounding them.25
A. COMMON LAW
At common law, grandparents had no legal visitation rights. 26 The
general rule compelling parents to allow grandparent visitation was a
moral, rather than a legal, obligation. 27 The courts justified this rule for
a number of reasons. 28 Some judges determined that granting grand-
parent visitation rights would undermine parental authority. 29 Thus, al-
though courts deemed it desirable that ties between ascendants and their
grandparents be strengthened and unceasing, the common law accorded
grandparents no authority over their grandchildren.30 If there was a
conflict, therefore, the father and mother had supreme authority. 31
Another justification for not ordering grandparent visitation was the
concern that if grandparents were granted visitation rights, the child
might be placed in an inter-generational conflict.32 There was concern
that this conflict could negatively affect the grandchild's development 33
and possibly lead to physical and emotional trauma for the child.34 For
23. See infra note 54.
24. See Hoff, 1 18, 595 N.W.2d at 291-92 (holding that section 14-09-05.1 of the North Dakota
Century Code unconstitutionally infringed upon the fundamental rights of parents to raise their chil-
dren); see also Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 774 (Ga. 1995) (finding a grandparent visitation
statute unconstitutional); Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 644 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (challenging
the constitutionality of Utah's grandparent visitation statute); Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1151
(Wyo. 1995) (alleging Wyoming's grandparent visitation statute was unconstitutional).
25. See Hoff, 18, 595 N.W.2d at 291-92 (finding North Dakota's grandparent visitation statute
unconstitutionally infringed upon the fundamental rights of parents to raise their children).
26. See King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 941 (1992) (stating that
grandparents had no legal right to visitation with their grandchildren at common law).
27. See Ward v. Ward, 537 A.2d 1063, 1067 (Del. Fain. Ct. 1987) (stating that, under common
law, grandparents had no legal right to visitation and thus parents did not have a legal obligation to
provide grandparents with visitation of their grandchildren).
28. Catherine M. Gillman, Note, One Big Happy Family? In Search of a More Reasoned Ap-
proach to Grandparent Visitation in Minnesota, 79 MiNN. L. REV. 1279, 1284 (1995).
29. See Odell v. Lutz, 177 P.2d 628, 629 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947) (stating that the law accords
ascendants no authority over children, and permitting them to intervene would occasion embarrass-
ment and annoyance and would injuriously hinder proper paternal authority).
30. Id.; see also In re Reiss, 15 So. 151, 152 (La. 1894) (stating that during the life of the father
and mother, the law accorded the grandparents no authority over grandchildren).
31. See Odell, 177 P.2d at 629-30.
32. Noll v. Noll, 98 N.Y.S.2d 938, 940 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950).
33. See id. (holding that where the mother was the proper, natural, and legal custodian of her
child, the court could not interfere with her decision to decline visitation with the child's grand-
parents).
34. See Flannery v. Sharp, 30 A.2d 810, 812 (Pa. 1943).
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example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Flannery v. Sharp35 found
that quarrels between the grandparents and the child's mother had a
negative effect on the child's health.36 Courts generally strive to avoid
this type of situation, 37 and at common law, courts primarily focused on
the health and welfare of the child and considered legal conflicts over
custody extremely detrimental to a child's well-being. 38 Therefore, for-
cing a child to endure visitations away from home in an environment to
which the child was not accustomed was considered injurious to the
child's health.39
In addition, courts justified the lack of grandparent visitation by
holding that parental autonomy is a fundamental constitutional right
recognized by the Fourteenth Amendment. 40 Absent a showing that
equity required intervention, courts did not have the power to intercede
when parents prevented the grandparents from visiting their grand-
children. 41 Courts thus held that granting separate grandparent visitation
rights would infringe on parents' fundamental constitutional rights.42
However, the common law did recognize exceptions to the general
refusal to award grandparent visitation rights. 43 The most common
exceptions were instances in which the parent was unfit to care for the
child or the child had been previously living with the grandparent. 44 If
the child had developed a close personal relationship with the grand-
35. 30 A.2d 810 (Pa. 1943).
36. Flannery v. Sharp, 30 A.2d 810, 812 (Pa. 1943). John's doctor testified that quarrels between
his grandparents and mother tended to make John neurotic. Id. John had several absences from
school that were contributed to intestinal disturbance in the upper abdomen; in the doctor's opinion, the





40. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (stating that the 14th Amendment pro-
tects against those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free people).
41. See Theodore R. v. Loretta J., 476 N.Y.S.2d 720, 721 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1984) (holding that
grandparents could not obtain visitation with a child in an intact family absent a showing of conditions
or circumstances which would justify intervention of equity).
42. See Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 577-78 (Tenn. 1993). During Bob and Bay Hawk's
marriage, their children frequently visited Bill and Sue Hawk, Bob's parents. Id. at 575. Despite these
frequent visits, conflicts developed between various members of the Hawk family and Bob and Bay
eventually refused to allow Bill and Sue to see their grandchildren. Id. at 576. The grandparents
sought court-ordered visitation with their grandchildren. Id. The court held that the parents had a
fundamental right to raise their children without unwarranted state intervention and denied the grand-
parents' request. Id. at 583; see also Theodore R., 476 N.Y.S.2d at 721 (denying grandparent visitation
because there should not be any judicial interference with the parents' fundamental parenting rights).
43. See Chodzko v. Chodzko, 360 N.E.2d 60, 62 (Il1. 1976) (stating that in cases involving special
circumstances, such as the death of a parent, grandparents may sometimes be granted court-ordered
visitation).
44. Aiamc.AN BAR AssocL TON, GRADPARENT VisrrAnON D tsprtns: A LEcAAL REsouRcE MANUAL
24 (Ellen C. Segal & Naomi Karp eds., 1989).
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parents, common law courts would sometimes make an exception and
allow the grandparents visitation rights.45 However, these exceptions
usually only applied in situations involving a parent's inability to
exercise visitation or in circumstances involving a death or divorce.
46
The rationale behind the common law rule and its exceptions was
that it served the best interests of the child.47 If there was a conflict
between parents and grandparents, it was presumed that judicial interven-
tion did not further the child's best interests. 48 This meant that when
courts did intervene and grant visitation to grandparents, they did so with
the best interests of the child in mind. 49 However, at common law, even
if a close relationship had developed between a child and his or her
grandparents, visitation rights could still be denied if the parent opposed
the visitation and other qualifying circumstances were present.50 The
policy of protecting the nuclear family was the underlying goal sought
to be obtained by common law, 51 and in the absence of special circum-
stances involving the best interests of the child, the courts generally
sought to preserve the nuclear family. 52 However, following states'
adoption of statutes allowing grandparents visitation rights, courts are
45. See Hawkins v. Hawkins, 430 N.E.2d 652, 654 (I1. App. Ct. 1981) (awarding grandparent
visitation because the natural mother was deceased and the child had a particularly close relationship
with his grandparents because of daily association).
46. See Boyles v. Boyles, 302 N.E.2d 199, 201 (Ill. 1973) (holding that after the death of the
mother, it was in the best interests of the child for the grandparents to be granted visitation).
. 47. See People ex rel. Edwards v. Livingston, 247 N.E.2d 417, 421-22 (HI. 1969) (stating that the
court's discretion to modify provisions of the decree concerning custody or to alter visitation rights
must be exercised for the best interests of the child involved); see also Catherine Bostock, Does the
Expansion of Grandparent Visitation Rights Promote the Best Interests of the Child?: A Survey of
Grandparent Visitation Laws in the Fifty States, 27 Cotum. J. L. & Soc. PROa. 319, 327 (1994).
48. See Chodzko, 360 N.E.2d at 63 (concluding the trial court erred by giving visitation rights to
the grandfather over the objections of the mother in the absence of any special circumstances justify-
ing the interference with the superior custodial right of the natural parent); see also Bostock, supra
note 47, at 327.
49. See Boyles, 302 N.E.2d at 201 ("[W]here a parent has died, the continuation of the
relationship between [the] child and grandparents, which may be promoted by visitation, may be a
positive benefit affecting the best interests of the child."); see also Bostock, supra note 47, at 327.
50. See Chodzko, 360 N.E.2d at 63 (holding that even though the father was willing to have the
court grant his father visitation during the time that the father normally had the children, this was no
reason for the court to give judicial sanction to such an arrangement because the mother opposed the
visitation); see also Bostock, supra note 47, at 328. This conforms with the parental rights doctrine,
which is mainly concerned with protecting the autonomy of parents. Bostock, supra note 47, at 328.
Child rearing is a fundamental value under common law, and courts are very hesitant to invoke the
state's parens patriae, or its power as the guardian of those in its boundaries, and intervene in the
family relationship. Bostock, supra note 47, at 328.
51. Bostock, supra note 47, at 329.
52. Bostock, supra note 47, at 330.
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now willing to interfere with parental rights when the best interests of the
child are at stake. 53
B. STATUTORY ADOPTION
The common law is no longer the rule with regard to grandparent
visitation rights, and in response to changing circumstances, all fifty
states have enacted some form of grandparent visitation legislation. 54
States enacted these statutes for a variety of reasons.55 For example, the
number of unmarried and divorced parents has increased, along with an
increase in the number of stepfamilies.5 6 State legislatures have also
recognized the significant role grandparents play in the development of
a child and have taken note of the state's duty to protect children's
welfare.57 In addition, the longevity of grandparents has increased, while
53. See King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1992) (holding that since the statute stipulated
grandparent visitation should be granted upon a finding that the best interests of the child be served by
granting or denying visitation, it would not be an injustice or an unwarranted intrusion into the
fundamental liberty of the parents and the child for the grandparents to be granted visitation).
54. See ALA. CODE §§ 26-10A-30, 26-1OA-31 (1975); ALA CODE § 30-3-4 (repealed 1999);
ALASKA STAT. § 25-20-065 (Michie 1996); Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-409 (West Supp. 1997); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-13-103 (Michie 1998); CAL. FAm. LAW CODE §§ 3103, 3104 (West 1994); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 19-1-117 (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59 (West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §
1031 (Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.13, 752.01 (West 1997 & Supp 1998); GA. CODE ANN. §
19-7-3 (Supp. 1998); HAW. REv. STAT. § 571-46 (Supp. 1997); IDAHOCODE § 32-719 (1996); 750 ILL.
Comp. STAT. ANN. § 5/607 (West Supp. 1998); 755 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 5/11-7.1 (West 1993); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-17-5-2 (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE § 598.35 (West Supp. 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§
38-129, 38-130, 60-1616 (1986 & Supp. 1993); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Michie Supp. 1996);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:344 (West Supp. 1998); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 136, (West 1994); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1001-1004 (West 1994); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 9-102 (Supp. 1997); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 39D (West 1993); MicH. CowP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27b (West 1998); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West 1998); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 93-16-1, 93-16-3 (1994); Mo. REV. STAT. §
452-402 (West 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-9-101 to -102 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802
(1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125A.340 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-d (1993); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2-7.1 (West Supp. 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2 (Michie 1994); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 72
(Consol. Supp. 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-5.1 (1993)
(declared unconstitutional in Hoff v. Berg); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.051 (Anderson Supp. 1997);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5 (West 1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.121 (1997); 23 PA. STAT. ANN. §§
5311-5313 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24.3 (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420
(Law. Co-op 1993); S.D. CODIFiED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-4-52,25-4-54 (Michie 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. §§
36-6-302, -306, -307 (Supp. 1997); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.433 (West Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-5-2 (Supp. 1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1101, 1102 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-204.1
(Michie 1995); WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.240 (West 1997); W. VA. CODE § 48-2B-1 (1996); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 767.245 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-101 (Michie 1997).
55. See supra note 54.
56. See Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 577 n.1 (Tenn. 1993) (stating that the movement to
create grandparent visitation statutes was a product of the nationwide increase in the number of
families broken by divorce); see also Ann M. Jackson, The Coming of Age of Grandparent Visitation
Rights, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 563, 563-64 (1994) (stating that the enactment of grandparent visitation
statutes was a response to the increasing number of unmarried or divorced parents, the existence of
stepfamilies, and the estrangement of extended families).
57. See Clark v. Evans, 778 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tenn. App. 1989) (stating the rationale behind the
enactment of grandparent visitation statutes was the competing interest of: 1) the parents and their
right to custody and control of their child; 2) the state's duty to protect the child; and 3) the recognition
that grandparents play a significant role in the development of a child).
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the number of grandchildren has decreased. 58 These factors have all
contributed to the enactment of grandparent visitation statutes in order to
provide stability and security in the unstable lives of children.5 9
The enactment of grandparent visitation statutes reflects upon the
"special bond" that develops between a child and his or her grand-
parent. 60 There are at least four "symbolic" roles that social scientists
have identified through which grandparents influence the lives of their
families. 61 The first is the role of "being there," which simply requires
the grandparent be present in the child's life.62 This role assists the
younger generation in two ways.63 First, the grandparents' mere pres-
ence in a child's life appears to help maintain a familial identity. 64
Second, by simply being there, grandparents can provide a stable influ-
ence on children, which is particularly important for children born of
early teenage mothers.65
The second role of grandparents is watching over the child for signs
of abuse or neglect and other traumatic occurrences that may be harm-
ing the child. 66 This "family watchdog" role serves as a lookout for
signs that indicate the child needs more care or attention. 67 The third
role grandparents play is that of "negotiator." 68 In this role, the grand-
58. Jackson, supra note 56, at 563-64; see also Christopher M. Bikus, One Step Forward, Two
Steps Back: The Nebraska Supreme Court Perpetuates the Uncertainty Surrounding the Grandparent
Visitation Statute in Eberspacher v. Hulme, 533 N.W.2d 103 (1995), 75 NEB. L. REV. 288, 291 (1996)
(stating that one factor in states' enactment of grandparent visitation statutes was the increased life
expectancy of grandparents).
59. See Clark, 778 S.W.2d at 448 (stating the statute was created to provide for the best interests
of the child); see also Bikus, supra note 58, at 291.
60. See Clark, 778 S.W.2d at 448 (stating that legislatures recognized the significant role grand-
parents played in the development of children); see also Rebecca Brown, Grandparent Visitation and
the Intact Family, 16 S. ILL. U. L. J. 133, 147-48 (1991) (stating that research supports the idea that a
"special bond" exists between the grandparent and the grandchild, and this "special bond" provides
security during times of instability in the child's life).
61. See Goffv. Goff, 844 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Wyo. 1993) (reviewing the four symbolic roles social
scientists have identified by which grandparents influence the lives of their families); see also VERN L.
BENGSTON, DivERsrrY AND SYMBOLS 1N GRANDPARENTAL ROLES 21 (Vern L. Bengston & Joan F.
Robertson eds., 1985) (describing the four major roles through which grandparents positively
contribute to the family).
62. See Goff, 844 P.2d at 1091 (stating the "being there" role requires nothing more than a
grandparents' presence); see also Bikus, supra note 58, at 292.
63. See Goff, 844 P.2d at 1091 (stating the "being there" role helps the younger generation in two
ways).
64. Id. The grandparents' presence in a child's life can exert a calming influence on the child in
times of transition, such as after the birth of a sibling or during a divorce. BENOSTON, supra note 61, at
22.
65. See Goff, 844 P.2d at 1091 (stating that grandparents can provide a stable environment for
children born to unwed mothers); see also BENGSTON, supra note 61, at 22.
66. See Goff, 844 P.2d at 1091 (stating that grandparents can protect their grandchildren by
looking for signs of abuse and neglect); see also BENOSTON, supra note 61, at 22.
67. See Goff, 844 P.2d at 1091 (stating grandparents can look for signs that indicate the family
will need active care and protection); see also BENGSTON, supra note 61, at 22.
68. See Goff, 844 P.2d at 1091 (stating that an "arbitrating" role may be assumed when
2000]
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parent acts as an impartial third party during differences between the
child and parent. 69 Finally, grandparents fulfill the role of the "inter-
preter" of the family history. 70 By spending time conversing with his or
her grandparents, a child learns about family history, helping to establish
a sense of identity within the child. 71
However, while grandparents have always played an important role
in the lives of children, only recently has the judicial system responded
to the belief that grandparents should be granted visitation rights. 72
Much of the recent success of grandparent visitation legislation seems to
be the result of senior lobbying in promoting the interests of grand-
parents. 73 This growing senior lobby is very active, and with regard to
grandparent rights, it is very united in its purpose. 7 4 Thus, the trend is
toward a continued push for the expansion of legislation involving
grandparent visitation rights.75
While every state has enacted some form of grandparent visitation
statute, the effects and requirements of these statutes vary widely. 76
Generally, these statutes may be grouped into three basic classes. 77 The
first and largest group of statutes require death, divorce, or a loss of
parental rights in order for grandparents to be allowed visitation. 78 An
grandparents actively negotiate between parents and children concerning values and behaviors that
may be more central to family continuity and individual enhancement than those that the parents'
authority status allow to be expressed); see also BENOSTON, supra note 61, at 22 (stating that
grandparents serve as a mediator between children and their parents in the "negotiator" role).
69. See Goff, 844 P.2d at 1091. This negotiation can occur when grandparents downplay disrup-
tive or volatile differences between the parents and the children; see also BENGSTON, supra note 61, at
22.
70. See Goff, 844 P.2d at 1091; see also BENOSTON, supra note 61, at 24.
71. See Goff, 844 P.2d at 1091 (stating that building connections between the family's past, pres-
ent, and future helps children form a sense of identity); see also BENGSTON, supra note 61, at 24 (stating
that visits with grandparents are often a precious part of a child's experience, and the benefits a child
receives from the relationship with his or her grandparents cannot be derived from any other
relationship).
72. See Hoff v. Berg, 1999 N.D. 115, 5, 595 N.W.2d 285, 287 (stating North Dakota's grand-
parent visitation statute, section 14-09-05.1 of the North Dakota Century Code, was originally enacted
in 1983); see also Mu-N. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (originally enacted in 1976); Bostock, supra note 47, at
331 (stating the trend is toward continued expansion of statutory visitation rights for grandparents).
73. Bostock, supra note 47, at 331 (contributing much of the success of grandparent visitation
legislation to the active senior lobby).
74. Bostock, supra note 47, at 325.
75. See supra note 54.
76. Mark Moody, Grandparent Visitation and Due Process Standards, Mo. L. REV. 195, 208
(1995).
77. Id.
78. See ALASKA STAT. § 25-20-065 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-409 (West Supp.
1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103 (Michie 1998); CAL. FAm. LAW CODE §§ 3103, 3104 (West 1994);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-117 (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-59 (West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit
10, § 1031 (Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.13 752.01 (West 1997 & Supp 1998); GA. CODE ANN. §
19-7-3 (Supp. 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46 (Supp. 1997); 755 ILL. CoMM. STAT. ANN. § 5/11-7.1
(West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-5 (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.35 (West Supp. 1998);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-129, 38-130, 60-1616 (1986 & Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:344 (West
Supp. 1998); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 136 (West 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1001-1004
(West 1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 39D (West 1993); Mic. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 722.27b
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example of this type of grandparent visitation statute is that enacted by
Wyoming.79 When the Wyoming legislature adopted Wyoming Statute
Annotated section 20-7-101 and amended section 20-2-113(c), the legis-
lature departed from the traditional derivative rights theory. 80 Under the
derivative rights theory, divorce could not give rise to grandparent
visitation rights.81 This shift away from the traditional derivative rights
theory demonstrates the recognition of the importance in the grand-
parent/grandchild relationship and focuses on the best interests of the
child.82
The second group of statutes allows visitation without taking into
account the family situation. 83 For example, Kentucky Revised Statute
Annotated section 405.021 states that paternal or maternal grandparents
may be granted reasonable visitation rights as long as it is in the best
interests of the child.84 Thus, a petty dispute between parents and grand-
parents would not prevent the court from awarding the grandparents
reasonable visitation with their grandchildren. 85
(West Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ArN. § 257.022 (West 1998); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-16-1, 93-16-3
(1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125A.340 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 458:17-d (1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West Supp. 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2 (Michie
1994); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 72 (Consol. Supp. 1998) (as interpreted in Emanuel S. v. Joseph E., 560
N.Y.S.2d 211, 214 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.051 (Anderson Supp. 1997);
23 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 5311-5313 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAw § 15-5-24.3 (1996); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.433 (West Supp. 1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1101, 1102 (1993); VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.1-204.1 (Michie 1995); W. VA. CODE § 48-2B-1 (1996); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-101
(Michie 1997).
79. See Goff v. Goff, 844 P.2d 1087, 1090 n.2 (Wyo. 1993). The statute provides that a
grandparent may be granted reasonable visitation if the grandparent's child, who is the parent of the
minor grandchild, has died or has divorced the minor grandchild's other parent, and the person having
custody of the minor grandchild has refused reasonable visitation rights to the grandparent. Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 20-7-101 (Michie 1997).
80. See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-113(c) (1991). Prior to the amendment, the statutory text pro-
vided that if one or both parents died or remarried, or if the parents were divorced, the grandparents
could be granted visitation rights if it was in the best interests of the child. WYo. STAT. ANN. §
20-2-113(c) (repealed 2000).
81. See Goff, 844 P.2d at 1091. Under the derivative tights theory, divorce could not give rise to
grandparental visitation rights because the related parent was not legally absent. Id.
82. Id.
83. See ALA. CODE §§ 26-1OA-30, 26-IOA-31 (1975); ALA CODE § 30-3-4 (repealed); IDAHO
CODE § 32-719 (1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Michie Supp. 1996); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 9-102 (Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.402 (West 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-9-101 to -102
(1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1993) (declared unconstitutional in Hoff v. Berg); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-13.2 (1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5 (West 1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.121 (1997);
S.C. CODE A NN. § 20-7-420 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-4-52, 25-4-54
(Michie 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-302, -306, -307 (Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2
(Supp. 1998); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 880.155 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997).
84. See King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1992) (stating that if the grandparent is physical-
ly, mentally, and morally fit, it is in the best interests of the child to have contact with the grandparent)
(citing Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (1994)). Some laws, such as Oklahoma's visitation statute, rely
on factors the court must weigh in determining the best interests of the child. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 5 (West 1998). Other states' statutes have relied on the court's discretion to determine the best
interests of the child. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-4 (repealed 1999).
85. See King, 828 S.W.2d at 635 (holding that even though the father and grandfather's relation-
ship was strained, it was in the best interests of the child for the grandparents to be granted visitation).
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The third group of statutes also does not take into account the
family situation, instead allowing visitation if the child had a substantial
relationship with the grandparents before the parents denied visitation. 86
This is exemplified by the Minnesota Supreme Court decision in In re
Santoro.87 The court held that since there was no substantial relationship
between the grandparents and their grandchildren, the grandparents were
not entitled to visitation rights. 88
However, despite differences among the various state grandparent
visitation statutes, all of the statutes share the same basic two-step struc-
ture.89 In the first step, the statutes generally specify circumstances that
establish standing requirements for grandparents. 90 In the second step,
the court decides, based on the facts of the case, the extent of the grand-
parent visitation under either a best interests of the child standard or a
reasonableness standard.9l While some statutes establish factors the court
must weigh in determining the best interests of the child, 92 other statutes
have relied on the court's discretion to determine the best interests of the
child.93 Regardless of how the grandparent visitation statutes are struc-
tured, however, opponents of these statutes argue that they infringe upon
86. See CAL. FAM. LAW CODE §§ 3103, 3104 (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West
1998); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 93-16-1, 93-16-3 (1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802 (1993); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-9-2 (Michie 1994); 23 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 5311-5313 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997); R.I. G FN.
LAWS 15-5-24.3 (1996); TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 153.433 (West Supp. 1998); W. VA. CODE § 48-2B-1
(1996); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-101 (Michie 1997).
87. 594 N.W.2d 174, 179 (Minn. 1999) (holding the trial court abused its discretion by awarding
the grandparents visitation rights).
88. See In re Santoro, 594 N.W.2d 174, 179 (Minn. 1999) (holding the grandparents should not
have been allowed visitation rights since a significant amount of time had transpired during which the
children had no relationship with their grandparents).
89. Bostock, supra note 47, at 332.
90. Bostock, supra note 47, at 332. For example, Minnesota's grandparent visitation statute con-
tains three provisions governing a grandparent's standing to petition for visitation. MINN. STAT. ANN. §
257.022. The death provision permits courts to grant jurisdiction to hear a petition from a grandparent
whose child has died. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022(1). The second provision, regarding dissolution,
grants standing to parents of the custodial or non-custodial parents to petition during marriage di-
ssolution proceedings. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022(2). The third provision, which concerns cohabita-
tion, allows grandparents the right to petition for visitation when their grandchildren have cohabited
with them for a 12-month period, regardless of marital status of the related parent. MINN. STAT. ANN. §
257.022(2a).
91. Bostock, supra note 47, at 332.
92. Bostock, supra note 47, at 332. For example, Oklahoma lists the following factors to be con-
sidered in determining the best interests of the grandchild: 1) the willingness of the grandparents to
encourage a close relationship between the grandchild and the parents; 2) the length and quality of the
prior relationship between the grandchild and grandparents; 3) preference of the grandchild; 4) men-
tal and physical health of the grandchild and grandparents; and 5) other factors. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 5 (West 1998).
93. ALA. CODE § 30-3-4 (repealed 1999) (allowing visitation privileges for grandparents, in
general, at the discretion of the court).
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parents' fundamental right to raise their children, and these statutes have
been constitutionally challenged on this basis.
94
C. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GRANDPARENT VISITATION STATUTES
Many grandparent visitation statutes have been challenged on the
ground that they violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 95 The Due Process Clause protects against state actions that
infringe upon fundamental rights and liberty interests.96 Although the
exactness of the fundamental rights and liberty interests guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment has not been defined, an important aspect of
these interests is the right to marry, establish a home, and raise
children. 97 The contention that grandparent visitation statutes are uncon-
stitutional rests upon the theory that these statutes interfere with parents'
fundamental right to raise their children by interfering with parents'
decisions concerning with whom their children may associate. 98 When
government action infringes upon a fundamental right or liberty interest,
the preliminary issue to be determined by the court is the appropriate
level of judicial review to be applied in determining if there has been a
substantive due process violation. 99
94. See King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1992) (holding Kentucky's grandparent visita-
tion statute constituted an unwarranted intrusion into the liberty interest of parents to rear their children
as they see fit); see also Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 582 (Tenn. 1993) (finding Tennessee's
grandparent visitation statute violated the parents child-rearing rights).
95. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating in part that no state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States and that no State shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law); see also Hoff v. Berg,
1999 N.D. 115, 15-17, 595 N.W.2d 285, 291-92 (N.D. 1999) (determining North Dakota's
grandparent visitation statute unconstitutionally infringed upon parents' fundamental rights to raise
their children); Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 774 (Ga. 1993) (concluding Georgia's
grandparent visitation statute violated the state and federal constitutions); Campbell v. Campbell, 896
P.2d 635, 644 (Utah App. Ct. 1995) (holding Utah's grandparent visitation statute violated the United
States Constitution); Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1151 (Wyo. 1995) (finding Wyoming's
grandparent visitation statute violated the due process requirements of the United States Constitution).
96. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997)
(stating that no state shall infringe upon fundamental rights or liberty interests without due process of
law).
97. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that a Nebraska statute prohibiting
the teaching of any language other than English unconstitutionally infringed upon the plaintiff's
fundamental right to speak and teach a language other than English).
98. See Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285, 291-92 (N.D. 1999) (holding the grandparent visitation
statute infringed upon the fundamental rights of parents to raise their children by infringing upon the
right of parents to determine with whom their children may associate); see also In re Smith, 969 P.2d
21, 31 (Wash. 1998), cert. granted sub nom, Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999) (finding the
Washington grandparent visitation statutes infringed upon parents' fundamental right to autonomy in
childrearing matters).
99. See Hoff, 12, 595 N.W.2d at 289 (stating that to decide the constitutionality of a statute, the
court must first determine the appropriate level of scrutiny).
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There are two levels of scrutiny that courts consider when determin-
ing the constitutionality of grandparent visitation statutes.100 The lowest
standard of review to satisfy is "rational basis." 101 This standard is ap-
plied when a fundamental liberty interest is not involved or when a court
finds a fundamental right has not been infringed upon by an alleged
state action. 102 Under rational basis review, the statute need only "be
rationally related to a legitimate government interest."103 Therefore, if
the state action bears a reasonable relation to a justifiable state interest, it
will be upheld. 104
At the other end of the spectrum, the most difficult standard of
review for a state action to survive is strict scrutiny. 105 Courts apply strict
scrutiny if the enjoyment of a fundamental right has been infringed
upon by a state action.106 In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,107 the
United States Supreme Court defined a fundamental right as one of
"those liberties that are deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."108 The Fourteenth Amendment forbids the government from
infringing upon the fundamental liberty interests of the people; there-
fore, a state action will not survive "unless it is narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling government interest."' 109 Thus, the appropriate level of
review applied by the court is a pivotal factor in determining the consti-
tutionality of a statute. 10
In order to analyze the constitutionality of grandparent visitation
statutes, three questions must be asked. 111 The first question is whether
100. Id. 13, 595 N.W.2d at 290.
101. See Alexander v. Whitman, 114 F.3d 1392, 1403 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating a rational basis level
of review is applied when fundamental rights or interests are not implicated); see also Moody, supra
note 76, at 200.
102. See Alexander, 114 F.3d at 1403 (stating a rational basis level of review is applicable when
fundamental liberty interests are not at stake).
103. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728 (finding Washington's ban on assisted suicide rationally re-
lated to legitimate government interests of protecting disabled and terminally ill people from prejudice,
negative and inaccurate stereotypes, and "societal indifference").
104. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305 (1993) (stating that a governmental action will be up-
held under rational basis scrutiny as long as there is a "reasonable fit" between the governmental
purpose and the means chosen to advance that purpose).
105. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (stating the 14th Amendment forbids the government to in-
fringe upon a fundamental right unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state purpose); see also Moody, supra note 76, at 199.
106. See Alexander 114 F.3d at 1403 (stating that when fundamental rights or liberty interests are
involved, strict scrutiny is the applicable standard of review).
107. 431 U.S. 494(1977).
108. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
109. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (holding that assisted suicide is not a fundamental right, and
therefore strict scrutiny was not applicable).
110. See Hoff v. Berg, 1999 N.D. 115, 112, 595 N.W.2d 285, 289 (stating that in order to decide
the constitutionality of North Dakota's grandparent visitation statute, the court must first determine the
appropriate level of scrutiny).
I 11. Moody, supra note 76, at 201.
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grandparent visitation infringes upon a liberty interest or fundamental
right.ll 2 Second, if the grandparent visitation does infringe upon a liber-
ty interest, the court must determine the appropriate level of scrutiny.113
The last question asks if the state's justification for infringing upon the
liberty interest can satisfy the appropriate standard of review.
114
The liberty interest guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment in-
cludes "the right of the individual to . . . marry, establish a home and
bring up children, . . . and generally enjoy those privileges long recog-
nized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men." 115 Accordingly, it is likely that statutes allowing grandparent
visitation do infringe upon a liberty interest since it is the parents'
decision to allow grandparents visitation with their children."l 6 There-
fore, it is the second and third questions that pose a tougher challenge to
the constitutionality of grandparent visitation statutes. 117
There is a division among the courts as to which standard of review
is applicable, despite the importance of the appropriate standard of
review chosen when determining the constitutionality of grandparent
visitation statutes. 118 The majority of courts have determined that
rational basis is the appropriate level of review. 119 Many of these cases
rely on the United States Supreme Court cases of Cleveland Board of
Education v. LaFleur,120 Moore v. City of East Cleveland,121 and Meyer
112. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (defining fundamental rights as "those liberties that are deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"); see also Moody, supra note 76, at 201.
113. Moody, supra note 76, at 201.
114. Moody, supra note 76, at 201.
115. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
116. Moody, supra note 76, at 201. Although parents have a fundamental right to raise their
children without state interference, the court in King v. King recognized that grandparents have a
fundamental right to visit their grandchildren. King v King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1992)
117. See Hoff v. Berg, 1999 N.D. 115,1 12, 595 N.W.2d 285, 289 (deciding the appropriate level
of scrutiny).
118. See, e.g., King, 828 S.W.2d at 632 (applying rational basis scrutiny by attempting to balance
the fundamental rights of the parents, grandparents, and child); Hoff, 16, 595 N.W.2d at 291
(applying strict scrutiny because the statute infringed upon the parents' fundamental right to control
their children's associations).
119. See, e.g., Bailey v. Menzie, 542 N.E.2d 1015, 1019-20 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (applying a
rational basis level of review because the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest,
and under certain circumstances, grandparents should have continuing contacts with the child's
development if it is in the best interests of the child); King, 828 S.W.2d at 632 (applying a rational basis
level of review in order to balance the fundamental rights of the parents, grandparents, and the child);
Herdon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 209 (Mo. 1993) (applying a rational basis level of review because
the statute did not impose an obstacle to the enjoyment of the parents' childrearing rights); Sibley v.
Sheppard, 429 N.E.2d 1049, 1052 (N.Y. 1981) (applying a rational basis level of review because the
family is not beyond regulation in the public interest).
120. 414 U.S. 632, 640 (1974) (applying rational basis review in holding that a regulation requir-
ing teachers to take maternity leave after five months of pregnancy and to wait three months after
giving birth to return to work was constitutional).
121. 431 U.S. 494, 495 (1977) (holding that parents have a fundamental right to raise their
children, but declining expressly to employ strict scrutiny in striking down a zoning ordinance that
20001 203
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
v. Nebraska,122 which recognize that the family is not beyond regulation
in the public interest. 123 Thus, when determining whether a state's
interference with the family relationship is proper, many courts apply a
less rigorous standard of review.124
For example, in Sibley v. Sheppard,125 although the New York
Court of Appeals recognized that parents have a fundamental right to
raise their children, the court also noted that "[p]rotecting the best
interests of the child is unquestionably a proper exercise of police
power."1 26 Using a rational basis test, the court held that awarding the
grandparents visitation rights did not infringe upon the adoptive parents'
childrearing rights because the state can properly exercise its police
power to protect the best interests of the child. 127 Thus, even though the
adoptive parents objected to the grandparent visitation, the statute was
deemed constitutional because it was rationally related to protecting the
best interests of the child.128
Additionally, in Herndon v. Tuhey, 129 the Missouri Supreme Court
held that the grandparent visitation statute at issue did not impose an
undue burden on parents' childrearing rights and was narrowly tailored
to protect the interest of the parties.130 The best interests of the child was
the focal point, and if the grandparent visitation was not in the child's
best interest, the grandparents were denied visitation. 131 In finding grand-
parent visitation to be in the child's best interest, the court held the
statute constitutional. 132
The court in Herndon closely followed the Kentucky Supreme
Court's reasoning in King v. King, 133 in which the court implemented a
forbade a mother from living with her son and two grandsons, who were cousins rather than brothers).
122. 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (holding the constitution prevents legislative action which is
arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some state purpose and thus finding a Nebraska statute that
forbade the teaching of a foreign language to any student who had not passed the eighth grade
infringed upon parents' fundamental childrearing rights).
123. See, e.g., King, 828 S.W.2d at 631; Sibley, 429 N.E.2d at 1052.
124. Sibley, 429 N.E.2d at 1052.
125. 429 N.E.2d 1049 (N.Y. 1981). After Willie's mother died, he was placed in a home for
neglected children. Sibley, 429 N.E.2d at 1050. He was then placed under adoption by respondents,
who frustrated visitation with Willie's grandparents. Id. The grandparents then commenced action
against Willie's adoptive parents, seeking visitation rights. Id.
126. Sibley, 429 N.E.2d at 1053.
127. Id. at 1052.
128. d. at 1053.
129. 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993).
130. See Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 209 (Mo. 1993) (stating a rational basis level of re-
view was applicable because grandparent visitation was not a substantial encroachment on the
family). The statutory text stated that the court may award grandparents visitation rights when a grand-
parent has been unreasonably denied visitation with the child for a period exceeding 90 days. See Mo.
REV. STAT. § 452.402.1(3) (Supp. 2000). Also, grandparent visitation may be granted if the court finds
it is in the best interests of the child for the grandparents to be allowed visitation. Mo. REV. STAT. §
452.402.2 (Supp. 2000).
131. See Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 209.
132. Id.
133. 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992).
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rational basis level of review. 134 In King, the court held that the Ken-
tucky grandparent visitation statute was constitutional. 135 However, the
court took a slightly different approach when it declared that grand-
parents had a fundamental right to visit their grandchildren 136 by stating
that the legislature had the power to strengthen family bonds.137 The
court therefore used a rational basis level of scrutiny and granted
visitation to the grandparents.138
However, not every grandparent visitation statute has been declared
constitutional.1 39 In Brooks v. Parkerson,140 the Georgia Supreme Court
found that there was insufficient evidence supporting the position that
grandparents' visitation with their grandchildren always promoted the
children's health and welfare.141 The statute also failed to require a
showing of harm before state interference because the state could only
impose visitation over parents' objections on a showing that failing to do
so would be harmful to the child.142 Thus, in applying strict scrutiny, the
court found the statute unconstitutional because it interfered with the
parents' constitutional child-rearing rights.143
The court also applied strict scrutiny to Tennessee's grandparent
visitation statute in Hawk v. Hawk.144 In finding the statute unconstitu-
tional, the court refused to accept the argument that the best interests of
the child constituted a compelling state interest which would be upheld
in a strict scrutiny analysis.145 Likewise, in Beagle v. Beagle,146 the
134. See Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 209 (stating the court decides if grandparent visitation is in the
best interests of the child).
135. See King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630,632 (Ky. 1992).
136. See id. (stating that the "statute seeks to balance the fundamental rights of the parents,
grandparents, and the child").
137. See id. (stating that some considerations, such as maintaining the special bond between
grandparents and grandchildren, easing the loneliness grandparents often feel by a lack of contact
with the child, and letting the child benefit from contact with the grandparents, are all rationally
related to the statute's goal of strengthening family bonds).
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1276 (Fla. 1996) (finding the grandparent visi-
tation statute unconstitutional because it violated parents' fundamental childrearing rights, a violation
for which the state did not demonstrate a compelling interest); Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769,
774 (Ga. 1995) (holding the grandparent visitation statute violated the constitutionally protected inter-
est of parents to raise their children without undue state interference); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d
573, 577 (Tenn. 1993) (holding the grandparent visitation statute violated the state constitutional right
to privacy in parenting decisions).
140. 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995).
141. See Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 774 (Ga. 1995).
142. Id.
143. See id. (applying strict scrutiny because the statute infringed upon parents' fundamental
right to raise their children).
144. 855 S.W.2d 573, 582 (Tenn 1993).
145. See Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 582 (Tenn. 1993) (applying strict scrutiny in finding
the grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional). The court stated that unless there was a "showing
of harm to the child, there is no compelling state interest in intervention into affairs of an autonomous
family, and any statute which authorizes such intervention violates the parents' liberty interest under
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Supreme Court of Florida held that if a natural parent objects to
court-ordered grandparent visitation, any visitation infringes upon the
parents' fundamental parenting rights.1 47 Since the statute infringed
upon a fundamental right, the court applied strict scrutiny and held the
statute unconstitutional.148
Although parents have a fundamental right to marry, establish a
home, and bring up their children, these cases illustrate the discrepancy
among the courts as to the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied
when deciding the constitutionality of grandparent visitation statutes. 149
Thus, while some states have held their grandparent visitation statutes to
be constitutional,1 50 other states, including North Dakota, have deter-
mined their grandparent visitation statutes are unconstitutional.iS1
D. NORTH DAKOTA GRANDPARENT VISITATION STATUTE
The original North Dakota grandparent visitation statute was enact-
ed in 1983 and was codified at North Dakota Century Code section
14-09-5.1.152 This statute provided in part:
The grandparents and great-grandparents of an unmarried
minor may be granted reasonable visitation rights to the minor
during the period of minority by the district court upon a find-
ing that visitation would be in the best interests of the minor
and would not interfere with the parent-child relationship.153
The reasoning behind the adoption of the grandparent legislation
centered on the grounds that "very often a close relationship develops
between the grandparent and a child and . . . severing it would be
damaging to the mental health of the child involved."154 Another
sponsor of the legislation also noted that a grandparent may be very
the 14th Amendment." Id.
146. 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996).
147. See Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1276 (Fla. 1996).
148. See id. at 1277 (stating that because the parents opposed the visitation awarded to the grand-
parents, the statute unconstitutionally infringed upon parents' fundamental right to raise their children).
149. See id. (applying strict scrutiny in holding the grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional).
But see Sibley v. Sheppard, 429 N.E.2d 1049, 1053 (N.Y. 1981) (applying rational basis review in
holding the grandparent visitation statute constitutional).
150. See, e.g., Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 210 (Mo. 1993) (holding the grandparent
visitation statute constitutional); Sibley v. Sheppard, 429 N.E.2d 1049, 1053 (N.Y. 1981) (holding the
grandparent visitation statute constitutional).
151. See, e.g., Hoff v. Berg, 1999 N.D. 115, 1 17, 595 N.W.2d 285, 291-92 (N.D. 1999) (holding
North Dakota's grandparent visitation statute unconstitutionally infringed upon parents' fundamental
childrearing rights); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 582 (Tenn. 1993) (holding Tennessee's
grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional).
152. See Hoff, 1 5, 595 N.W.2d at 288.
153. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (as enacted in 1983).
154. Brief of State Attorney General at 20-21, Hoff v. Berg, 1999 N.D. 115, 595 N.W.2d 285
(N.D. 1999) (No. 980208) (citing Hearings on HB 1274 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 48th
Legis. (North Dakota Jan. 19, 1983) (statement of Senator Maixner)).
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influential in exposing the child to his or her heritage.155 Thus, without
the bill, it would be extremely difficult for grandparents to petition for
visitation rights of their grandchildren.156
In 1993, the legislature amended the statute to strengthen the ability
of grandparents to visit their grandchildren.' 57 The amended statute
provided in part:
The grandparents of an unmarried minor must be granted
reasonable visitation rights ... to the minor ... by the district
court upon application by the grandparents . . . unless a
finding is made that visitation is not in the best interests of the
minor. Visitation rights of grandparents to an unmarried
minor are presumed to be in the best interests of the minor. 158
This amendment was proposed because in situations in which a step-
parent adopted the child, the contact between grandparents and grand-
child was often terminated. 159 The difference between the original
statute and the amended version is that the amended statute presumes
grandparent visitation is in the best interests of the child. 160 This pre-
sumption places the burden on the custodial parent to produce evidence
that grandparent visitation is not in the best interests of the child.161
Specific findings of fact concerning the best interests of the child
are required by the court in order to award grandparents visitation
rights.162 Under North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-05.1, the
court is required to consider "the amount of personal contact between
the grandparents or great grandparents of the minor, and the minor's
parents, prior to the application."1 63  In Schempp v. Cook,164 a 1990
case, the court held that the trial court failed to make specific findings of
fact as to whether grandparent visitation was in the best interests of the
155. Id. at 21 (citing Hearings on HB 1274 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 48th Legis.
(North Dakota Jan. 19, 1983) (statement of Senator Meiers)).
156. Id. at 21 (citing Hearings on Hb 1274 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 48th Legis.
(North Dakota Jan. 19, 1983) (statement of Rep. Wentz)).
157. Id. at 21 (citing 1993 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 150).
158. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (as amended in 1993).
159. Brief of State Attorney General at 21, Hoff (No. 980208) (citing Hearings on HB 1462 Be-
fore the House Judiciary Comm., 53d Legis. (North Dakota Jan. 27, 1993) (statement of Senator
Mahoney)).
160. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1997).
161. Brief of State Attorney General at 21-22, Hoff (No. 980208) (citing Hearings on HB 1462
Before the House Judiciary Comm., 53d Legis. (North Dakota Jan. 27, 1993) (statement of Senator
Mahoney)).
162. See Schempp v. Cook, 455 N.W.2d 216, 217 (N.D. 1990) (reversing the trial court's order
granting the grandparents visitation because the trial court did not make findings as required by section
14-09-05.1 of the North Dakota Century Code).
163. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (stating the requirements for the court to consider when
determining if grandparent visitation is in the best interests of the minor).
164. 455 N.W.2d 216 (N.D. 1990).
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child and so reversed the trial court's decision awarding visitation to the
grandparents.16
5
Although Schempp was decided in 1990, findings of fact that
grandparent visitation is in the best interests of the child are still
important under North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-05.1.166
However, the situation under the 1993 amended version of the statute is
different because of the presumption that grandparent visitation is in the
best interests of the child. 167 The burden thus shifts to the parents of the
child to show that grandparent visitation is not in the best interests of the
child.168 Absent these findings of fact, the grandparents must be award-
ed visitation rights. 169 It was the presumption that grandparent visitation
was in the best interests of the child that spurred the constitutional
challenges of North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-05.1.170
In Peterson v. Peterson, 171 the parents challenged the constitutional-
ity of North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-05.1, alleging the
statute infringed upon their fundamental right to raise their child without
state interference. 172 The parents also argued that the scope of the
grandparent visitation awarded by the trial court infringed upon their
parenting roles because it reduced the father's overtime and also made it
difficult to enroll their child in gymnastics and other extracurricular
activities. 173 However, the case was reversed and remanded for other
reasons; therefore, the court did not decide the constitutionality of North
Dakota Century Code section 14-09-05.1.174
165. See Schempp v. Cook, 455 N.W.2d 216,217 (N.D. 1990).
166. See N.D. CENr. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1993) (stating the court shall consider the amount of
personal contact between the grandparents and the grandchild).
167. See id. (stating grandparent visitation is presumed to be in the best interests of the minor).
168. Id.
169. See id. (stating grandparents must be granted visitation rights unless a finding is made that
visitation is not in the best interests of the minor).
170. See Peterson v. Peterson, 1997 N.D. 14, 22, 559 N.W.2d 826, 832 (declining to decide if
section 14-09-05.1 of the North Dakota Century Code unconstitutionally infringed upon parents' funda-
mental right to be free from undue state interference on parents in raising their child).
171. 1997 N.D. 14, 559 N.W.2d 826.
172. See Peterson v. Peterson, 1997 N.D. 14, 6, 559 N.W.2d 826, 828.
173. Id. at 828-29. After Kent and Tracy's son Brett was born, the couple developed marital con-
flicts that resulted in Kent living on the farm with his parents while Tracy lived with Brett 25 miles
away in Valley City. Id. 2, 559 N.W.2d at 828. Tracy refused to let Kent's parents visit with Brett,
prompting them to petition for visitation with their grandson. Id. The court awarded visitation to
Kent's parents on the first Saturday of each month from 10 a.m. to 7 p.m. and on the third weekend of
the month from Friday at 7 p.m. to Saturday at 7 p.m. Id. 3. The court also ordered visitation to
Kent's parents on the Christmas holiday. Id. Shortly after the court granted visitation to Kent's par-
ents, Kent and Tracy reconciled their marriage, and the couple moved to Fargo where Kent began
working construction and Tracy became a full-time homemaker. Id. 4. Kent's parents then sought
an order to show cause alleging Tracy was not complying with the visitation order. Id.
174. See id. 22, 559 N.W.2d at 832 (stating that it was not necessary to determine the constitu-
tionality of section 14-09-05.1 of the North Dakota Century Code because the reversal was due to the
trial court's erroneous expansion of visitation hours without a request by the grandparents to do so).
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By enacting North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-05.1, the
North Dakota legislature provided grandparents an opportunity to
petition the court for formalized visitation with'their grandchildren.175
The 1993 amendment to this statute strengthened grandparents' rights to
visitation with their grandchildren, but also raised constitutional issues
surrounding the statute by presuming that grandparent visitation was in
the best interests of the child. 176 Although the constitutionality of North
Dakota Century Code section 14-09-05.1 was presented in Peterson, it
was not ultimately decided until Hoff v. Berg.177
The court's decision in Hoff demonstrates that questions surround-
ing grandparent visitation rights remain. 178 States' adoption of grand-
parent visitation statutes has replaced the common law, by which grand-
parents had no legal right to visitation with their grandchildren.1 79
However, since the United States Supreme Court has held that parents
have a fundamental right to raise their children, many of these grand-
parent visitation statutes, including North Dakota's, have been constitu-
tionally challenged.' 8 0 Thus, even though all fifty states have changed
the common law by enacting grandparent visitation statutes, the constitu-
tional challenges of these statutes demonstrate that the visitation rights of
grandparents are an unsettled issue. 181
III. ANALYSIS
In Hoff, the North Dakota Supreme Court recognized that when the
constitutionality of a statute is challenged, it is presumed to be correct
and valid unless it clearly impugns the state or federal constitution. 182
However, the court also noted that a statute may be declared unconstitu-
175. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1997).
176. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (as amended in 1993).
177. See Hoff v. Berg, 1999 N.D. 115,1 18, 595 N.W.2d 285, 291-92 (finding section 14-09-05.1
of the North Dakota Century Code unconstitutional); see also Peterson, 1 6, 559 N.W.2d at 829.
178. See Hoff, 18, 595 N.W.2d at 291-92 (finding North Dakota's grandparent visitation statute
unconstitutional); see also King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1992) (holding that Kentucky's
grandparent visitation statute was constitutional).
179. See King, 828 S.W.2d at 632 (stating that under common law grandparents had no legal right
to visitation with their grandchildren).
180. See Hoff, 118, 595 N.W.2d at 291-92 (holding North Dakota's grandparent visitation statute
unconstitutionally infringed upon parents' fundamental rights to raise their children); see also Brooks
v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 774 (Ga. 1993) (finding Georgia's grandparent visitation statute violated
the state and federal constitutions); Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 644 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
(concluding Utah's grandparent visitation statute violated the United States Constitution).
181. See In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 24 (Wash. 1998), cert. granted sub nom., Troxel v. Granville,
120 S. Ct. 11 (1999) (stating the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to decide the
constitutionality of Washington's grandparent visitation statute).
182. See Hoff, 7. 595 N.W.2d at 288 (citing Traynor v. Leclerc, 561 N.W.2d 644 (N.D. 1997)
(stating that the court will presume a statute is constitutional unless the challenger demonstrates the
statute's constitutional infirmity)).
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tional if at least four members of the court rule that the challenger has
shown the constitutional infirmity of the statute. 183 The Hoff court
emphasized that the power of courts to declare a statute unconstitutional
should be exercised with restraint, caution, and reluctance because it is
one of the highest functions of the courts. 184
Parents' right to make decisions concerning the rearing of their
children is a very sensitive area, and the United States Supreme Court is
often called upon to decide the constitutionality of statutes regarding
parental rights. 185 The Supreme Court has consistently held that a
parent's right to raise his or her children is an essential and basic civil
right.186 Thus, when there is governmental interference with the funda-
mental right of childrearing, the Supreme Court has determined that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause provides a heightened
protection against this interference. 187
The North Dakota Supreme Court has followed the United States
Supreme Court, noting that, in due process claims, if a statute infringes
upon a fundamental right, only a compelling state interest can warrant
the infringement.188 The statute must be narrowly tailored to serve this
compelling interest; thus, the court stated that the statute will only be
upheld if it satisfies strict scrutiny. 189 In contrast, the court reasoned that
a rational basis level of scrutiny will be employed in situations where
fundamental rights are not involved. 190 To survive rational basis review
in a substantive due process challenge, the court reiterated that the
legislation need only be rationally related to a legitimate government
interest. 191
The Hoffs argued that a rational relationship standard should have
been applied since the statute did not infringe upon a fundamental
right.192 Alternatively, the Hoffs contended that "if it is determined that
North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-05.1 does substantially
infringe upon parental rights, the State has shown a compelling interest
183. See id. (citing Best Prods. Co. v. Spaeth, 461 N.W.2d 91, 96 (N.D. 1990) (stating that in
order for a statute to be declared unconstitutional, at least four members of the court must find that the
challenger has shown the constitutional infirmity of the statute)).
184. See id., 595 N.W.2d at 287-88 (quoting Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Johanneson, 153
N.W.2d 414, 420 (N.D. 1967)).
185. See id. 18.
186. See id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923)).
187. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
188. See Hoff, 1 13, 595 N.W.2d at 290 (citing Alexander v. Whitman, 114 F.3d 1392, 1403 (3d
Cir. 1997) (analyzing the recently employed levels of scrutiny in due process claims)).
189. See id. (citing Alexander, 114 F.3d at 1403).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. 1 16, 595 N.W.2d at 291.
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in promoting the best interests of children, and the legislation is narrowly
tailored to meet those ends." 193 Likewise, the North Dakota Attorney
General' 94 claimed that a rational basis standard of review should be
applied because reasonable grandparent visitation is only a minimal
intrusion on parental rights, thus, the level of scrutiny should not be
raised.195 The Bergs, on the other hand, claimed that strict scrutiny
should be applied because the statute interfered with their fundamental
parenting rights.196
The court resolved this disagreement in favor of the Bergs, stating:
[T]he pursuit of happiness guaranteed by [North Dakota
Constitution Article I, section 1,] includes "the right to enjoy
the domestic relations and the privileges of the family [and the
home] .. .without restriction or obstruction ... except in so
far as may be necessary to secure the equal rights of others,"
which is protected and insured by the due process clause of
[North Dakota Constitution article I, section 12.1197
In accordance with the North Dakota Constitution, the North Dakota
Supreme Court had previously decided that "[p]arents have a funda-
mental, natural right to their children which is of constitutional
dimension." 198 Relying on earlier cases, therefore, the court stated that
the constitutional right of parents to the custody and companionship of
their children is paramount to the right of any other person to have the
custody and companionship of the child. 199 The court held that only a
193. Id. (arguing that the statute is narrowly tailored to justify the ends).
194. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-134 (1997). When a proceeding involves legislation that is
allegedly unconstitutional, section 10-32-134 of the North Dakota Century Code permits the attorney
general to submit a brief. Id. The statute provides in part:
[I]f it appears at any state of a proceeding in a court in this state that the state is, or is
likely to be, interested in the proceeding or that it is a matter of general public interest,
the court shall order that a copy of the complaint or petition be served upon the attorney
general in the same manner prescribed for serving a summons in a civil action.
Id. Thus, since the proceeding involved allegedly unconstitutional legislation, the attorney general was
involved in the action. Id.
195. Hoff, 16, 595 N.W.2d at 291.
196. Id.
197. Id. 1 15, 595 N.W.2d at 290 (quoting State v. Cromwell, 9 N.W.2d 914, 919 (N.D. 1943)).
198. Hoff, 1 10, 595 N.W.2d at 289 (citing In re L.F., 1998 N.D. 129. 1 9, 580 N.W.2d 573, 576;
Kleingartner v. D.P.A.B., 310 N.W.2d 575, 578 (N.D. 1981)).
199. See id. (citing Boeddeker v. Reel, 517 N.W.2d 407, 409 (N.D. 1994) (awarding custody of
the children to the parents rather than the state because the parents have a constitutional right to
custody of their child)); Patzer v. Glaser, 396 N.W.2d 740, 743 (N.D. 1986) (holding that even though
the grandparents were the child's psychological parents, it was not such an exceptional circumstance
as to warrant placement of child with grandparents rather than the mother because the constitutional
right of parents to the custody of their children is paramount to the right of any other person); Hust v.
Hust, 295 N.W.2d 316, 318 (N.D. 1980) (reversing the trial court's order granting the grandparents
custody of their grandchild because the parents have a paramount and constitutional right to the
custody and companionship of their children superior to that of any person)).
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compelling state interest will justify legislation that burdens the funda-
mental right of parents to maintain a relationship with their children. 200
The court recognized that the right to raise one's children without state
interference is deeply rooted in American tradition. 20 1 It further ac-
knowledged that American traditions dictate keeping state intervention
out of the family home. 20 2
Finally, the court determined that the right to raise one's child and
choose with whom the child may associate is a right of the highest order,
and that a state's infringement upon this right may only be justified by
showing a compelling state purpose that furthers the best interests of the
child.203 Accordingly, since North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-
05.1 burdened parents' fundamental right to control their children's
associations, the court employed strict scrutiny in determining that a com-
pelling state purpose did not justify the infringement upon this right. 204
The court stated that when North Dakota Century Code section
14-09-05.1 was amended in 1993, the statute not only presumed that
grandparent visitation was in the best interests of the child, but it also
stipulated that grandparents must be provided with visitation rights unless
the court finds visitation not to be in the best interests of the child.205
The court also noted that this statute was sensitive to grandparents who
desire to see their grandchildren, but for some reason or another they are
denied visitation.206 However, while promoting grandparent visitation
rights is a legitimate state interest, the court observed that the parental
right of choosing with whom one's children may associate is among the
most important parental rights.207
The court recognized that the Due Process Clause of the North
Dakota Constitution protects parents' fundamental liberty interest of
controlling with whom their children may associate.208 The court found
that North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-05.1 infringed upon this
right by presuming grandparent visitation was in the best interests of the
child. 209 Thus, because methods of promoting grandparent visitation
may be more narrowly tailored to accomplish the purpose behind North
200. See id. (relying on In re K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d 558, 564-65 (N.D. 1993) to show that the state
bears the burden of demonstrating a compelling state interest that justifies infringement on the parents'
fundamental right to raise their children).
201. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
202. See Hoff, 1 10, 595 N.W.2d at 289.
203. See id. 15, 595 N.W.2d at 290-91.
204. See id. 16, 595 N.W.2d at 291 (applying strict scrutiny).
205. See id. 17.
206. See id. 18.
207. Id.
208. Id. 18, 595 N.W.2d at 291-92.
209. Id., 595 N.W.2d at 291.
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Dakota Century Code section 14-09-05.1, the North Dakota Supreme
Court found North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-5.1, as amended
in 1993, unconstitutional. 210
IV. IMPACT
When the North Dakota Supreme Court declares legislation unconsti-
tutional, it becomes void and is treated as if it were never enacted.2 11
Accordingly, unconstitutional legislation that modifies an existing statute
is a nullity and cannot affect the existing statute in any manner. 212 Thus,
the extant statute remains in effect, and the unconstitutional legislation is
disregarded. 213 By declaring North Dakota Century Code section 14-
09-05.1, as amended in 1993, unconstitutional, the court left the 1983
statute intact until it is validly repealed or amended. 214
Shortly after Hoff was decided, the North Dakota Supreme Court
resolved Love v. Dewall.215 The facts in Love were different from Hoff
because the grandparents had custody of their grandchild for a period of
time during which the court deemed the biological parents unfit. 21 6
During that time, the grandparents became the child's psychological
parents. 217 Love is contrasted by the more typical grandparent visitation
cases, in which the grandparents have not actually had custody of the
grandchild but are seeking visitation rights either to establish or to main-
tain a close relationship with their grandchild. 2 18 Although the court
noted that North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-05.1, as amended
in 1993, was deemed unconstitutional in Hoff,219 the exceptional
210. See id., 595 N.W.2d at 291-92 (finding section 14-09-05.1 of the North Dakota Century
Code unconstitutional to the extent it required courts to award grandparents visitation rights with an
unmarried minor unless visitation was found not to be in the best interests of the child).
211. See id. 19, 595 N.W.2d at 292 (citing State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168, 169 (N.D. 1985)).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See id. (stating section 14-09-05.1 of the North Dakota Century Code, as enacted in 1983,
remains intact).
215. See Love v. Dewali, 1999 N.D. 139, 1 1, 598 N.W.2d 106, 106.
216. Id. 1 2, 598 N.W.2d at 107. Three years after D.C. was born, the trial court determined that
his biological parents were unfit parents and awarded custody of D.C. to his grandparents. Id A year
later, D.C.'s mother married D.C.'s stepfather and was awarded extended visitation with D.C. after
complying with the trial court's rehabilitation requirements. Id. 1 3. A year after that, D.C.'s mother
was granted sole custody of D.C., with visitation rights to the grandparents. Id.
217. See id. (explaining that when a person provides daily care and develops a close personal
relationship with the child, that person becomes the psychological parent to whom the child turns for
love, guidance, and security).
218. Compare id. (stating that this case was not a typical grandparent visitation case because the
grandparents were the psychological parents of the child), with Hoff, 1 2, 595 N.W.2d at 286-87
(stating the grandparents sued because they were dissatisfied with the visitation afforded them), and
Peterson v. Peterson, 1997 N.D. 14, 1 4, 559 N.W.2d 826, 828 (stating the grandparents essentially
wanted their visitation rights enforced).
219. See Hoff, 1 18, 595 N.W.2d at 291-92.
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circumstances surrounding the Love case dictated that the grandparents
were entitled to maintain their visitation rights because a close bond still
existed between the grandparents and their grandchild. 220
Despite the decision in Love, the implications of Hoff point to an
increased difficulty for grandparents to obtain visitation of their grand-
children. 221 North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-5.1, as amended
in 1993, provided that grandparent visitation was presumed to be in the
best interests of the child and that grandparents must be granted visita-
tion unless the parents showed visitation was not in the best interests of
the child.222 However, since the statute was declared unconstitutional, the
1983 grandparent visitation statute remains intact until it is either re-
pealed or amended. 223 This statute provides that grandparents may be
allowed visitation only if the court finds it is in the best interests of the
child.224 The shifting of the burden places the grandparents in the diff-
icult position of proving that visitation is in the best interests of the
child. 225
Nationally, however, the future of grandparent visitation statutes is
uncertain. Recently, the Washington state grandparent visitation statute
was declared unconstitutional by the Washington Supreme Court in In re
Custody of Smith.226 The statute provided that any person could be
granted visitation rights if the court found the visitation to be in the best
interests of the child.227 After finding the petitioners had standing to
petition the court for visitation, 228 the court deemed the statute unconsti-
tutional because it interfered with the parents' fundamental right to
220. See Love, 13, 598 N.W.2d at 110 (finding that since D.C.'s grandparents were his psycho-
logical parents, an exceptional circumstance existed that warranted granting D.C.'s grandparents
visitation in the best interests of D.C.). Without explicitly stating so, the court seemed to refer to sec-
tion 14-09-05.1 of the North Dakota Century Code, as enacted in 1983, to determine that it was in
D.C.'s best interests that his grandparents be awarded visitation rights. Id. 9, 598 N.W.2d at 108-09.
221. See id. 13, 598 N.W.2d at 110; see also Brief of State Attorney General at 21, Hoff v.
Berg, 1999 N.D. 115, 595 N.W.2d 285 (No.980208) (stating that legislative testimony indicates that
under the old grandparent visitation statute, grandparents found it difficult to prove visitation was in the
best interests of the child).
222. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1997).
223. See Hoff, 19, 595 N.W.2d at 292 (stating that unconstitutional statutes are void and should
be treated as if they were never enacted).
224. See id. 5, 595 N.W.2d at 287 (placing the burden on the grandparents to show visitation is
in the best interests of the child).
225. Brief of State Attorney General at 21-22, Hoff (No. 980208) (citing Hearings on HB 1462
Before the House Judiciary Comm., 53d Legis. (North Dakota Jan. 27, 1993) (statement of Senator
Mahoney)).
226. See In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 30-31 (Wash. 1998), cert. granted sub nom., Troxel v. Gran-
ville, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999). The Washington Supreme Court consolidated three cases, In re Wolcott, In
re Troxel, and In re Smith, in order to decide the constitutionality of Washington's grandparent visita-
tion statute. Id. at 23.
227. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West 1997).
228. See Smith, 969 P.2d at 27 (stating the plain language of the statute allows the petitioners to
petition for visitation at any time).
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make decisions regarding their children. 229 In response, the grandpar-
ents appealed, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 230
The case was argued before the United States Supreme Court, and the
decision is expected in June of 2000.231
The Washington and North Dakota grandparent visitation statutes,
although both declared unconstitutional by their respective state supreme
courts, share similarities and differences. 232 The Washington statute
provided that any nonparent may be granted visitation with the child if
the court finds that visitation is in the best interests of the child.233 In
contrast, North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-05.1, as amended in
1993, presumed that only grandparents must be granted visitation unless
visitation is not in the best interests of the child.234 The distinguishing
factor is that any person may be granted visitation of the child in Wash-
ington,235 while in North Dakota only the grandparents' visitation rights
were presumed to be in the best interests of the child. 236
Despite the differences in standing requirements, the Washington
statute and the original North Dakota grandparent visitation statute are
generally quite similar.237 Since the amended version of North Dakota
Century Code section 14-09-05.1 was declared unconstitutional, 238 the
original statute places the burden on the grandparents to show visitation
is in the best interests of the child.239 Similarly, the Washington statute
also places the burden on the petitioning party to show visitation is in the
best interests of the child.240 Thus, in both states, if the court finds the
third party visitation to be in the best interests of the child, visitation
rights may be granted. 241
229. See id. at 30-31 (stating that the "best interests of the child" standard was insufficient to
serve as compelling state interest that could overrule a parent's fundamental childrearing right).
230. See id.
231. Id.
232. See Hoff v. Berg, 1999 N.D. 115, 18, 595 N.W.2d 285, 291-92 (holding section 14-09-
05.1 of the North Dakota Century Code, as amended in 1993, unconstitutional); see also Smith, 969
P.2d at 30-31 (holding the statutes addressing visitation rights of nonparents were unconstitutional).
233. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West 1997). Washington Revised Code An-
notated 26.10.160(3) provides that "any person may petition the court for visitation at any time includ-
ing, but not limited to, custody proceedings." Id. It further provides that "the court may order
visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interests of the child whether or not
there has been any change in circumstances." Id.
234. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1993).
235. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 26.10.160(3).
236. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1.
237. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (as enacted in 1983), with WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. §
26.10.160(3).
238. See Hoff v. Berg, 1999 N.D. 115, 18, 595 N.W.2d 285, 291-92 (holding section
14-09-05.1 of the North Dakota Century Code, as amended in 1993, unconstitutional).
239. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (as enacted in 1983).
240. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(3).
241. See id.; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (an enacted in 1983).
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Depending on the United States Supreme Court Ruling in In re
Smith,242 the decision could impact the state of North Dakota. If the
Supreme Court rules the Washington statute is constitutional by conclud-
ing that grandparents may petition for visitation with their grandchildren,
North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-05.1 will likely remain as
held in Hoff.243 However, if the Court holds the Washington statute inter-
feres with parents' right to raise his or her child, the original version of
North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-05.1 also could be declared
unconstitutional. One last possibility is that the Supreme Court may
only decide the standing issue of the Washington statute and not rule on
the constitutionality of the statute. If this happens, the decision will
probably not impact North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-05.1,
and the statute will remain as held in Hoff.244
David T. Whitehouse
242. See In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21 (Wash. 1998), cert. granted sub nom., Troxel v. Granville, 120
S. Ct. 11 (1999).
243. See Hoff, 19, 595 N.W.2d at 292 (stating unconstitutional legislation is void and is to be
treated as if it were never enacted).
244. See id.
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